It has been suggested that activities in discrete mathematics allow a kind of new beginning for students and teachers. Students who have been "turned off" by traditional school mathematics, and teachers who have long ago routinized their instruction, can find in the domain of discrete mathematics opportunities for mathematical discovery and interesting, nonroutine problem solving. Sometimes formerly low-achieving students demonstrate mathematical abilities their teachers did not know they had. To take maximum advantage of these possibilities, it is important to know what kinds of thinking during problem solving can be naturally evoked by discrete mathematical situations-so that in developing a curriculum, the objectives can include pathways to desired mathematical reasoning processes. This article discusses some of these ways of thinking, with special attention to the idea of "modeling the general on the particular." Some comments are also offered about students' possible affective pathways and structures.
Possibilities for Discrete Mathematics
In their accompanying article, DeBellis and Rosenstein (2004) describe a vision for discrete mathematics in the schools of the United States, one toward which they have both contributed substantially over a decade and a half. They see the domain of discrete mathematics-a looselydefined term that includes combinatorics, vertex-edge graphs, iteration and recursion, and many other topicsas providing teachers with "a new way to think about traditional mathematical topics and a new strategy for engaging their students in the study of mathematics." Through experiences in discrete mathematics, they suggest that teachers may better be able to help children "think critically, solve problems, and make decisions using mathematical reasoning and strategies." And they cite Gardiner (1991) in cautioning, "If instead discrete ma-thematics is introduced in the schools as a set of facts to be memorized and strategies to be applied routinely ... [its qualities] as an arena for problem solving, reasoning, and experimentation are of course destroyed."
It is certainly an appealing idea that students who have been "turned off" by traditional school mathematics, and teachers who have long ago routinized their instruction, can find something quite new here. Evidently the novel possibilities have to do less with particular formulas and techniques of combinatorics, search or sorting algorithms, theorems about graphs, and so on, than with the opportunities for interesting, nonroutine problem solving and for mathematical discovery that discrete mathematics may provide (cf. Kenney & Hirsch, 1991; cf. Rosenstein, Franzblau, & Roberts, 1997) . Here I would like to emphasize the importance of characterizing these opportunities more specifically, both mathematically and cognitively.
The following questions deserve consideration: (1) What especially desirable ways of thinking, powerful problem-solving processes, or other important mathematical competencies do discrete mathematical situations naturally evoke? (2) Why are these particular processes or capabilities evoked in students? Under what problem conditions do we expect them to occur? Why might we anticipate the emergence of previously hidden mathematical capabilities in some students, and which capabilities are these? (3) How can we consciously structure students' activities so as to best encourage the further development of the mathematical capabilities we have identified? Can we do this through discrete mathematics more readily or naturally than we could through a comparable commitment to conventional arithmetic, algebra, or geometry? (4) How can or should we assess the degree to which student performance is enhanced-in discrete mathematics particularly, and in the mathematical field generally?
Of course, in a short article one can discuss only small parts of these questions. Here I shall focus on just two aspects: (a) heuristic processes for mathematical problem solving, especially the way of thinking we may call "modeling the general on the particular", and (b) students' affective pathways and structures.
A Problem for Discussion
Let us consider a specific and rather well-known "nonroutine" problem-solving activity, in order to lend concreteness to the discussion.
You are standing on the bank of a river with two pails. One pail holds exactly 3 liters of water, and the other holds exactly 5 liters. The pails are not marked for measurement in any other way. How can you carry exactly 4 liters of water away from the river?
This is a problem I have given many times, to children and to adults. While it does not fall clearly into one of the above-mentioned domains of discrete mathematics, it has features in common with problem activities drawn from many of those domains. It is "discrete" in the sense of involving discrete steps that are permitted at any point by the problem conditions. It is sufficiently "nonroutine" for even the mathematical interpretation of the problem conditions to be challenging to many. Like "counting problems" in combinatorics, it requires the problem solver to devise some means of keeping track of what has already been done. Like "coloring problems" and "shortest route" problems, it invites successive trials that may fail to satisfy the problem conditions. Like many problems in discrete mathematics, this problem is also suggestive of a possible hidden structure that would, if recognized, make the solution easy to see.
Schematically, one may represent this problem by means of a state-space diagram as in Fig. 1 , where each node (or problem state) corresponds to a configuration with a fixed, known volume of water in each of the pails, and each arc corresponds to the step of filling a pail at the river, emptying a pail, or pouring water from one pail into the other until the latter is full (Goldin,1984) . In Fig. 1 the ordered pair of numbers (0,2), for example, refers to the configuration where the 3-liter pail is empty and there are 2 liters of water in the 5-liter pail. In effect, such a representation is a directed, connected vertex-edge graph, where a selected vertex (node) is understood to be the "initial state" and a characterization is provided of vertices (nodes) that are "goal states." The problem is thus one of finding a path along directed edges through this graph, linking the initial state to one of the goal states. We see-rather trivially, once the graph has been displayed-that there are two such solution paths, that they are related by symmetry but not equivalent at the level of pails and moves, and that each is only seven steps long. Furthermore, we note that there is in an important sense no way to go wrong in searching this statespace. That is, if one begins with the empty pails and takes any step at all, and then just proceeds without giving up or returning to one of the initial few states, one inevitably reaches a goal state. There are no "blind alleys" in this particular directed graph.
Why, then, is a strong sense of impasse experienced by some who attempt this problem? What are the desirable processes that this problem has a high likelihood of evoking, and why are they likely?
Of course, the problem solver does not have in front of her the representation of Fig. 1 . The first challenge is to interpret the problem statement in a way that makes conventional "mathematical sense," turning the problem into one where something specific and non-arbitrary can be done in the face of requirements that may superficially appear to describe an impossibility. Thus some solvers respond initially with ideas that fall outside the problem conditions. Common initial responses include, "two liters in each pail" (without suggesting a way of arriving at such a configuration), or "three and five are eight, and four is half of eight, so I'll fill each pail halfway" (without attending to the condition that the pails are unmarked for measurement).
Naturally such answers do make sense. The fact that they are outside the intention behind the stated problem conditions does not mean they are undesirable-indeed, thinking "outside the box" is often just what non-routine problems require. Here, further questions or elaboration by the one who posed the problem can suggest that the problem is not yet solved: "How can you obtain two liters in each pail?" or "There is no way to fill the pails exactly halfway, when they aren't marked for measurement." An early point of possible impasse, then, occurs with the necessity of realizing that not only may either pail be filled to the brim at the river bank with knowledge of the volume, but also (more profoundly) that the contents of one pail may be partially poured into the other pail until the latter is full, allowing knowledge of the volume of water remaining.
Supposing these possibilities to be understood-i.e., adequately represented internally-by the problem solver, important potential impasses still remain. Many solvers begin to imagine pouring water from pail to pail, but after three or four steps come to feel they are making no progress-and repeatedly start over. Some are hesitant to construct an external written record, or perhaps are not sure how to do it-but without some systematic external representation, the memory load is high. "I forgot where I was", "I'm not getting anywhere", or "I'm sure I did this before, and it didn't work" are typical comments, even when the potential solver is only one step away from the goal. Some give up in frustration after a short series of such attempts. Others overcome this impasse by keeping track systematically of the steps they have taken, or by persevering despite feelings of "getting nowhere."
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the absence of an obvious evaluation criterion whereby an intermediate state-(2,5) for instance-can be judged as "closer" to the goal of having 4 liters than a state such as (3,2) reached three steps earlier. Most problem solvers do try to avoid returning to states reached before, and if enforced rigorously, this criterion alone is sufficient to propel one to a goal state. But in the absence of some other signal suggesting that one is "getting closer", many seem to override this criterion and interrupt their search.
A factor contributing to this tendency may be the presence of a pair of distinct possible initial steps. The moment that a problem solver begins by filling up one pail, she may already be conscious of the possibility of having made a "wrong" choice, a mistake. The more steps that are taken without reaching the goal, the more likely it
